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INTRODUCTION 
As biopharmaceutical forms of technology, vaccines constitute one of the most important 
tools for the promotion and maintenance of public health. Tolstoy famously wrote that “[h]appy 
families are all alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.”1 Vaccine markets offer 
                                                        
* Assistant Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law, Center for Health Law Studies and Center for 
Comparative and International Law. S.J.D., LL.M., Duke Law School. I am grateful to the participants at the Texas 
A&M University Property Law Journal 2019 Fall Symposium for helpful comments and insights. 
1 Much more structured arguments have been made formalizing a so-called Anna Karenina principle in other 
academic areas. See e.g. Dwayne R. J. Moor, The Anna Karenina Principle Applied to Ecological Risk Assessments 
of Multiple Stressors, 7 J. HUM. & ECO. RISK ASS’T 231 (2010). 
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perhaps one of the most extreme embodiments of Tolstoy’s principle2 in the field of 
biopharmaceutical innovation. Vaccines are often described as one of the most unprofitable types 
of biopharmaceutical goods, under-incentivized from a research and development (R&D) 
perspective, and routinely failing to attract sufficient investment from traditional funders in 
biopharma.3 In this sense, and despite the scientifically well-established value of vaccines from a 
public health perspective, vaccine markets are often portrayed as a collection of unhappy families.4 
Yet, at least throughout the developed world, there are plenty of examples of steadily profitable 
vaccine markets, as is the case of recently developed vaccines targeting the human papilloma virus 
(HPV).5  
The Essay begins by mapping this dualism in vaccine R&D and commercialization, 
describing both “happy” and “unhappy” markets. It then connects the development of new 
vaccines with the default legal regime to promote innovation in the biopharmaceutical arena: the 
patent system. In exploring possible solutions for transactional problems arising in connection with 
the development of vaccine technology, the Essay asks whether the rights covering vaccine 
technologies are best understood as property rights or as something else. This inquiry is of course 
but a fragment of a much larger interrogation of the nature and mechanics of intellectual property 
systems: are intellectual property rights—and rights arising out of the grant of patents in 
                                                        
2 Principle is used here in a non-formalized way, merely as an indication of the narrative and prescriptive emphasis 
on the malfunctions of IP regimes in connection with vaccine R&D, as opposed to the success stories—or “happy” 
narratives—surrounding vaccines for which there is both demand and adequate supply. 
3 See e.g. Ruth Young et al., Developing New Health Technologies for Neglected Diseases: A Pipeline Portfolio 
Review and Cost Model, GATES OPEN RESEARCH (Feb. 19, 2020) (finding chronic and R&D lacunas for several 
priority vaccines), https://gatesopenresearch.org/articles/2-23/v2 
4 The term family applied here further reflects the fact that vaccines for certain families or types of pathogens fare 
better than others. Infra, Parts I.A-B. 
5 Infra, Part I.B. 
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particular—more like property or akin to something else? Arguing that under the current non-
committal position of the Supreme Court there is room for understandings of patent rights that are 
not property-centric,6 the Essay concludes by exploring how less property-like protection—in the 
form of a liability regime for critical components of vaccine technology—can remove some of the 
most salient transactional obstacles to the development and commercialization of new and better 
vaccines. 
 
I. DUALISM IN VACCINE MARKETS 
Vaccines have long been recognized as one of the most cost-effective ways of preventing 
and mitigating the burden of disease in scientific literature and practice.7 The development of 
vaccines targeting new pathogens, as well as the improvement of existing vaccines, remain a 
crucial component of public health preparedness perspective,8 as evidenced by the emphasis placed 
on vaccine R&D during the COVID-19 pandemic.9  
                                                        
6 See Oil States, infra note 110. 
7 See F.E. Andre et al., Vaccination Greatly Reduces Disease, Disability, Death and Inequity Worldwide, BULL. 
WORLD HEALTH ORG., https://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/86/2/07-040089/en/; Vanessa Rémy et al., 
Vaccination: The Cornerstone of an Efficient Healthcare System, J. MKT. ACCESS & HEALTH POL’Y 27041 (2015). 
See also Bruce Gellin et al., Vaccines as Tools for Advancing More than Public Health: Perspectives of a Former 
Director of the National Vaccine Program Office, 32 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 283 (2001), 
https://academic.oup.com/cid/article/32/2/283/320376 
8 See e.g. Peter F. Wright, Vaccine Preparedness — Are We Ready for the Next Influenza Pandemic?, 358 NEW 
ENGL. J. MED. 2540 (2008) (discussing preparedness in connection with the development of a universal flu vaccine). 
9 See e.g. Tung Thanh Le et al., The COVID-19 Vaccine Development Landscape, NATURE REV. DRUG DISCOVERY 
(Apr. 9, 2020), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41573-020-00073-5 (surveying numerous vaccine R&D vaccine 
efforts during the COVID-19 pandemic).  
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Some vaccines become commercially successful.10 For instance, Merck’s vaccine targeting 
human papillomavirus (Gardasil) has become a best-seller, increasing its yearly revenue in 2018 
from $1.7 to $3.2 billion.11 The vast majority of vaccines for infectious diseases, however, are 
deemed unprofitable by industry standards.12 These diseases, which historically have affected 
populations located predominantly in the Global South, are becoming increasingly globalized, as 
illustrated by the recent outbreaks of Ebola, Zika and COVID-19.13  
Vaccine markets thus present innovators, funders, policy- and lawmakers with a split 
landscape. A restricted number of vaccines like Gardasil fare well under contemporary market-
based approaches—and, in this sense, make for “happy” narratives within the vaccine innovation 
ecosystem. But the majority of vaccines needed to address the burden posed by infectious diseases 
makes for an “unhappy” narrative for numerous reasons, ranging from scientific (viruses mutate 
quickly, for instance) to market-driven (certain patient populations are so small that, from the 
perspective of R&D funders, return on investment is unlikely).14 The following sections provide 
an account of this dualism. 
                                                        
10 See e.g. Bourree Lam, Vaccines Are Profitable, So What?, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 10, 2015), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/02/vaccines-are-profitable-so-what/385214/ 
11 See Trefis Team, Merck’s $3 Billion Drug Jumped To 4x Growth Over Previous Year, FORBES (Oct. 4, 2019), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2019/10/04/mercks-3-billion-drug-jumped-to-4x-growth-over-
previous-year/#5bc71e0c6294. See also Ed Silverman, Switching to Newest HPV Vaccine Can Save Billions in 
Health Care Costs, Study Says, STAT (Apr. 18, 2016), https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/2016/04/18/sex-
vaccine-merck-gardasil/ 
12 See e.g. Luis Barreto, The Industry Perspective, in VACCINES: PREVENTING DISEASE & PROTECTING HEALTH, 
CIRO A. DE QUADROS, ED. (2004), at 308. 
13 See Lance Salker et al., Globalization and Infectious Diseases: A Review of the Linkages, WORLD HEALTH ORG. 
(2004), https://www.who.int/tdr/publications/documents/seb_topic3.pdf 
14 See generally Ana Santos Rutschman, The Intellectual Property of Vaccines: Takeaways from Recent Infectious 
Disease Outbreaks, 118 MICH. L. REV. ONLINE 170 (2020). 
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A. HAPPY MARKETS 
In a report to Congress in 2018, the Department of Health and Human Services 
characterized the vaccine R&D ecosystem in the United States as “successful” and as a “well 
established” enterprise, which has brought “innovative and new and improved vaccines to the 
market.”15 At the time, there were over 120 vaccine candidates under development, with R&D 
being conducted in collaborative models involving heterogenous players, including the public 
sector, pharmaceutical companies, universities, non-profit organizations and the private sector.16  
The development of certain vaccines has always been considered a priority in the United 
States.17 The best illustration of the alignment between public health imperatives and support for 
R&D is perhaps the development of the first polio vaccine.18 Polio is a crippling disease that may 
result in paralysis or death.19 Outbreaks of the disease intensified from the late nineteenth century 
onwards, triggering a race among scientists to develop competing vaccine candidates in the 1940s 
and early 1950s.20 In 1952, the disease, which affected between 25,000 and 50,000 people every 
year in the United States, killed 3,000 children.21 The first polio vaccine was made available in the 
                                                        
15 ANGELA SHEN, ENCOURAGING VACCINE INNOVATION: PROMOTING THE DEVELOPMENT OF VACCINES THAT 
MINIMIZE THE BURDEN OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES IN THE 21ST CENTURY [hereinafter ENCOURAGING VACCINE 
INNOVATION] (Jun. 25, 2018) (on file with author). 
16 Id., ib. 
17 Id., ib. (noting that “[p]ublic health priorities have historically been evident to stakeholders due to the clear 
disease burden of many infectious agents (e.g., polio) and public health demand for vaccines”). 
18 See generally DAVID M. OSHINSKY, POLIO: AN AMERICAN STORY (2006). 
19 WORLD HEALTH ORG., Poliomyelitis (polio), http://www.who.int/topics/poliomyelitis/en/ 
20 Anda Baicus, History of Polio Vaccination, 1(4) WORLD J. VIROL. 108 (2012). 
21 Gilbert King, Salk, Sabin and the Race Against Polio, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Apr. 3, 2012). 
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United States in 1955.22 By 1961, the rates of polio infection had dropped by a factor of 17.23 
Largely due to the R&D efforts that took place in the mid-twentieth century,24 today polio has been 
reduced by 99%.25 
In addition to responding to pressing public health needs, the race to develop a polio 
vaccine unfolded against an R&D and funding backdrop that remains unmatched in the history of 
vaccine development.26 The mid-twentieth century remains one of the golden periods—if not the 
golden period—of vaccine development.27 Both the number of licensed vaccines manufacturers 
and the number of new vaccines entering the market remain unmatched: for instance, the estimated 
number of vaccines commercialized in the 1940s was around 60;28 at that point, the United States 
market had over 50 vaccine manufacturers, in sharp contrast with single digits from the 1990s 
onwards.29  
                                                        
22 Baicus, supra note 20. 
23 Id., ib. (reporting a drop in infection rates from “13.9 cases per 100,000 [people] in 1954 to 0.8 cases per 100,000 
[people] in 1961” in the United States). 
24 Combined with immunization campaigns, as well as surveillance and monitoring practices. 
25 WORLD HEALTH ORG., 10 Facts on Polio Eradication, https://www.who.int/features/factfiles/polio/en/ 
26 See generally U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, A REVIEW OF SELECTED FEDERAL VACCINE 
AND IMMUNIZATION POLICIES, BASED ON CASE STUDIES OF PNEUMOCOCCAL VACCINE (1979) [hereinafter OTA 
REVIEW] (describing the vaccine R&D landscape in the United States through the early and mid-twentieth century). 
27 Ana Santos Rutschman, The Vaccine Race in the 21st Century [hereinafter Vaccine Race], 61 ARIZ. L. REV. 729, 
738-744 (2019). 
28 KENDALL HOYT, LONG SHOT: VACCINES FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE 180–86 (2012). Today that number is around 
80, but the rate of vaccines targeting new pathogens, as well as new vaccine technology, has dropped significantly. 
Rutschman, Vaccine Race, supra note 27, at 742. See also U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., VACCINES LICENSED FOR 
USE IN THE UNITED STATES, https://www.fda.gov/biologicsbloodvaccines/vaccines/approvedproducts/ucm0938 
33.htm (providing an overview of currently licensed vaccines in the United States market). 
29 OTA REVIEW, supra note 26. 
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In addition to the historical market(s) for vaccines of the 1940s and 1950s,30 there are 
currently several vaccines with stable and sizable markets. In the United States, the federal 
government recommends the administration of certain vaccines to almost all individuals, based on 
age and medical indications.31 These include vaccines against polio, tetanus and measles, mumps 
and rubella (MMR).32 The Affordable Care Act imposes insurance coverage of CDC-
recommended vaccines, which in practice translates into the inexistence of cost-sharing or co-pay 
requirements for patients.33 The tandem created by federal recommendation of vaccines and 
mandatory coverage thus fuels both R&D and commercialization of vaccines falling under this 
umbrella. 
Moreover, there are cases in which public and private-sector players are motived to engage 
in R&D even though the market is short-lived or there are scientific impediments to vaccine 
development. The example of flu vaccines is instructive. Existing flu vaccines, which have to be 
developed on a yearly basis to respond to mutating pathogens, are covered by the Affordable Care 
Act proviso.34 Universal flu vaccines, on the other hand, have long posed scientific challenges 
during R&D stages and have yet to be successfully developed. Nevertheless, R&D in this area 
                                                        
30 Considered transversally as to include different types of vaccines and vaccine technology, as well as different 
pathogens targeted by a multiplicity of R&D projects. 
31 See U.S. CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, RECOMMENDED CHILD AND ADOLESCENT IMMUNIZATION 
SCHEDULE FOR AGES 18 YEARS OR YOUNGER, UNITED STATES, 2020, 
https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/schedules/hcp/imz/child-adolescent.html 
32 U.S. DEP’T HEALTH HUM. SERV., VACCINES & IMMUNIZATIONS, https://www.hhs.gov/programs/prevention-and-
wellness/vaccines-and-immunizations/index.html 
33 U.S. DEP’T HEALTH HUM. SERV, WHERE AND HOW TO GET VACCINES, https://www.hhs.gov/ash/oah/adolescent-
development/physical-health-and-nutrition/vaccines/where-and-how-to-get-vaccines/index.html 
34 U.S. CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, HOW THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT INCREASES ACCESS TO 
INFLUENZA VACCINATION FOR HEALTH CARE PERSONNEL, https://www.cdc.gov/flu/toolkit/long-term-care/aca.htm 
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continues to attract interest from the public and private sectors alike.35 While not very common, 
this is not the only example of a field of vaccine R&D that remains well populated—R&D on 
vaccine candidates targeting respiratory syncytial virus, which causes mild symptoms in most 
patients but can lead to severe consequences for infant and older populations,36 attracts sustained 
interest from private-sector firms.37 
Finally, and as documented above, the recent success of Merck’s HPV vaccine, Gardasil, 
speaks to the possibility of blockbusters in vaccine markets. Even blockbuster vaccines, however, 
generate much less revenue than blockbuster pharmaceutical or biopharmaceutical products in 
other areas. For instance, best-selling biologics generate tens of billions in revenue—the world’s 
best-selling drug in any category, Humira, has reached $20 billion globally.38 Gardasil, on the 
other hand, made headlines for reaching $3 billion in yearly revenue in 2018.39 
Outside the “happy” scenarios surveyed above, this disparity in revenue stream makes 
investment on vaccine R&D prospectively unappealing to investors in the private sector. As the 
public sector lacks the financial and infrastructural capacity to develop and commercialize 
vaccines exclusively on its own, large R&D lacunas—and potentially serious public health 
                                                        
35 ENCOURAGING VACCINE INNOVATION, supra note 15 (noting that “The development of certain vaccines — for 
example, universal influenza vaccines and respiratory syncytial virus (RSV) vaccines for infants — is considered a 
high priority as reflected in the number of companies working on these vaccine targets”). 
36 U.S. CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, RESPIRATORY SYNCYTIAL VIRUS INFECTION (RSV), 
https://www.cdc.gov/rsv/index.html 
37 Id., ib. 
38 See e.g. Alex Keown, AbbVie Raises 2019 Profit Target Amid Sliding Global Humira Sales, BIOSPACE (Jul. 26, 
2019), https://www.biospace.com/article/despite-sliding-global-humira-sales-abbvie-beasts-analysts-estimates/ 
39 Trefis Team, Merck’s $3 Billion Drug Jumped To 4x Growth Over Previous Year, FORBES (Oct. 4, 2019), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2019/10/04/mercks-3-billion-drug-jumped-to-4x-growth-over- 
previous-year/#4e4113de6294.  
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consequences—arise in connection with vaccines with estimated small markets. The Essay now 
turns to these “unhappy” scenarios in vaccine R&D. 
 
B. UNHAPPY MARKETS 
In early 2020, a novel strain of coronavirus made headlines as it spread across the world.40 
As the magnitude of the outbreak became apparent, the U.S. National Institutes of Health (NIH) 
were among the first institutions funding the development of a coronavirus vaccine.41 The director 
of the U.S. National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases described the process of getting 
private-sector companies to join the project as “very difficult and very frustrating.”42 During the 
very early stages of the coronavirus outbreak, no large pharmaceutical company expressed 
interested in partnering with NIH.43 Eventually, major vaccine manufacturers like Johnson & 
Johnson, Novavax, Inovio and Gilead started developing vaccines targeting the novel 
coronavirus.44 Even at that point, many commentators remained concerned that “if the outbreak 
[were to] slow(…) down, industry interest in a vaccine could plummet.”45 
The initial reluctance from the private sector in engaging in vaccine R&D—which now 
registers as almost infinitesimal within the timeline of the extended outbreak—illustrates the 
                                                        
40 U.S. CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, CORONAVIRUS DISEASE 2019 (COVID-19) SITUATION SUMMARY, 
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/summary.html 
41 Nicholas Florko, Major Drug Makers Haven’t Stepped Up to Manufacture NIH Coronavirus Vaccine, top U.S. 
health official says, Stat (Feb. 11, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/2020/02/11/major-drug-makers-havent-stepped-
up-to-manufacture-coronavirus-vaccine-top-u-s-health-official-says/ 
42 Id., ib. 
43 Id., ib. 
44 Alex Lee, Why We Shouldn't Pin Our Hopes on a Coronavirus Vaccine, WIRED (Feb. 6, 2020), 
https://www.wired.co.uk/article/coronavirus-vaccine-china 
45 Id., ib. 
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problems surrounding vaccines from an innovation perspective. Even when outbreak-induced 
funding becomes available for expedited R&D, they remain unappealing as an investment prospect 
to the players with the greatest manufacturing ability and the deepest pockets. 
While the development and deployment of vaccines against infectious diseases has led to 
the eradication of some diseases, and while they prevent high levels of morbidity and mortality 
associated with many others diseases, most markets for vaccines targeting infectious diseases are 
generally considered unprofitable.46 To begin with, the indicated population tends to be smaller47 
than populations in markets for pharmaceutical products targeting prevalent diseases including a 
multitude of cardiovascular, oncological and autoimmune conditions.48 Moreover, there are long-
recognized difficulties in calculating savings to health systems stemming from vaccine use.49 And 
even for players motivated to engage in vaccine R&D there are hurdles that were largely absent in 
the polio days: while the golden age of vaccine development in the mid-twentieth century 
translated into numerous new vaccines entering the market, R&D on remaining targets has become 
                                                        
46 ENCOURAGING VACCINE INNOVATION, supra note 15 (“The prevailing business model prioritizes vaccine 
candidates with large markets; yet market sizes are likely smaller for many remaining targets”). For a summary of 
the characteristics of vaccines that have traditionally rendered them less attractive from an R&D perspective, see 
Rutschman, The Intellectual Property of Vaccines: Takeaways from Recent Infectious Disease Outbreaks, 118 
MICH. L. REV. ONLINE __ (2020), at __.  
47 A recent exception to this rule has been the case of the COVID-19 pandemic, during which there was pronounced 
demand—and at global level—for a vaccine targeting the underlying pathogen. See e.g. Ed Yong, How the 
Pandemic Will End, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 25, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2020/03/how-will-
coronavirus-end/608719/; Laura Spinney, Coronavirus Vaccine: When Will We Have One?, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 
15, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/15/coronavirus-vaccine-when-will-we-have-one-covid-19 
48 See e.g. Kate Cox, What Are The 10 Biggest Money-Making Prescription Drugs, And What Do They Treat?, 
CONSUMER REPORTS (Sept. 26, 2017), https://www.consumerreports.org/consumerist/what-are-the-10-biggest-
money-making-prescription-drugs-and-what-do-they-treat/  
49 See e.g. Mondher Toumi & Walter Ricciardi, The Economic Value of Vaccination: Why Prevention is Wealth, 3 J. 
MKT. ACCESS HEALTH POL’Y (2015). 
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substantially more complex from a scientific perspective, requiring exponentially higher 
investment levels than before.50  
These dynamics lead R&D on numerous vaccine targets to be chronically underfunded.51 
The Essay now turns to the default legal regime that should in principle cure some of the 
imbalances affecting incentives frameworks for vaccine R&D—as Part II will show, however, in 
practice that is not the case. 
 
II. VACCINE MARKETS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
As seen above, many types of vaccines needed to prevent or mitigate the effects of 
infectious diseases fail to attract appropriate levels—if any—of investment. Because intellectual 
property remains the primary legal regime designed to incentivize investment in underfunded 
areas, the Essay now turns to the role, and shortcomings, of patent regimes in connection with 
vaccine R&D.  
There is an additional moment in the vaccine innovation ecosystem in which intellectual 
property frameworks are relevant: as a vaccine candidate progresses through the R&D pipeline, 
patent rights often arise in connection with individual components of a single vaccine.52 If discrete 
components needed to make a vaccine are patented by different, non-cooperating entities—or if 
an entity holding rights over an entire vaccine fails to bring it to market—intellectual property may 
erect new hurdles to commercialization of vaccines that were able to overcome shortcomings in 
incentives frameworks.  
                                                        
50 Id., ib. 
51 See Ruth Young et al., supra note 3. 
52 The Vaccine Race, supra note 27 (surveying the rise of an intellectual property culture surrounding vaccine 
R&D). 
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Part A briefly summarizes problems related to the incentives-enhancing function of patent 
regimes, while Part B addresses problems posed by transactional inefficiencies within patent 
regimes covering vaccine technology. 
 
A. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AS INCENTIVES 
Contemporary intellectual property regimes are often cast as systems of incentives.53 In 
exchange for the ability to exclude would-be competitors from the market for a period of time, 
innovators have an incentive to embark on risky and resource-intensive endeavors that might 
otherwise never receive funding.54 Patents embody this utilitarian ethos perhaps better than any 
other domain in intellectual property.55  
If the prospective function of patents functioned as (at least nominally) intended in the area 
of vaccines, then the possibility of market exclusivity should outweigh to some extent the risk and 
cost associated with vaccine R&D. Because vaccines are socially desirable, there would be an 
alignment between public health imperatives—development, production and distribution of one of 
                                                        
53 See e.g. Stephen M. Maurer, Intellectual Property Incentives: Economics and Policy Implications, in OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, ROCHELLE DREYFUS & JUSTINE PILA, EDS. (2018). For an account of 
different framing IP theories complementing the incentives narrative, see WILLIAM FISHER, THEORIES OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, CYBER HARV. (1987), https://cyber.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/iptheory.pdf 
54 See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Problem of New Uses, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 717, 720 (2005) 
(explaining how this view of intellectual property has been particularly resonant in the pharmaceutical and 
biopharmaceutical areas). 
55 See e.g. Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, infra note 104, at 599 (stating that the “encouragement of investment-based 
risk is the fundamental purpose of the patent grant, and is based directly on the right to exclude”); F. Scott Kieff, 
Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 697 (noting that “[t]he 
foundation for the American patent system is purely economic”). See also generally ROBERT P. MERGES & JOHN F. 
DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY (7th ed. 2017). 
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the most cost-effective tools for preventing disease or mitigating its burden—and the catalytic 
function of the patent system in fields of R&D that can rely on market prospectivity the least. 
In practice, however, the patent system on its own is incapable of incentivizing sustained 
R&D on many types of vaccines we collectively need,56 including vaccines for which the required 
scientific knowledge exists prior to the outbreak of an infectious disease.57 It should be noted that, 
apart from the now historically ingrained pervasiveness of patent regimes in contemporary 
innovation infrastructure,58 there is no particular reason why vaccine R&D should be considered 
to be best incentivized through intellectual property incentives. After all, intellectual property 
offers a transversal mode of promoting innovation, with the patent system—at least in its overall 
design—being technology agnostic.59 
To be sure, vaccines are not the only type of product for which intellectual property 
incentives have, time and again, shown to be insufficient. Other categories include antibiotics,60 
orphan diseases61 and neglected tropical diseases (such as Chagas disease, dengue or 
                                                        
56 See Rutschman, The Intellectual Property of Vaccines, supra note 14. 
57 See Rutschman, IP Preparedness for Outbreak Diseases, IP Preparedness for Outbreak Diseases, 65 UCLA L. 
REV. 1200 (2018) (describing the development of an Ebola vaccine candidate before the 2014-16 Ebola outbreak 
and how it failed to attract private-sector support for clinical testing).  
58 Which, admittedly, is no small feature of the current innovation ecosystem. 
59 See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1155, 1156 
(2002) (noting that “[w]ith very few exceptions, the [patent] statute does not distinguish between different 
technologies in setting and applying legal standards.). 
60 See e.g. Aaron S. Kesselheim & Kevin Outterson, Fighting Antibiotic Resistance: Marrying New Financial 
Incentives to Meeting Public Health Goals, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1689 (2010). 
61 In the United States, orphan diseases are defined as conditions affecting fewer than 200,000 people. U.S. FOOD & 
DRUG ADMIN., ORPHAN PRODUCTS: HOPE FOR PEOPLE WITH RARE DISEASES (2018), 
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/drug-information-consumers/orphan-products-hope-people-rare-diseases. See also 
Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (1983); U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., ORPHAN PRODUCTS: HOPE 
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leishmaniasis).62 Moreover, not all underinvestment in vaccine R&D is rooted in insufficiency of 
intellectual property incentives: scientific complexity in many areas of vaccine R&D has increased 
substantially from the heyday of polio research onwards.63 
These additional factors further complicate the economics and dynamics of vaccine R&D. 
An overview of the current landscape for vaccine development shows that most R&D efforts64 are 
currently centered on cancer vaccines65—precisely one of more difficult types of vaccine R&D 
from a scientific perspective—as opposed to simpler forms of vaccine development, such as some 
of the types of vaccines used to target pathogens causing infectious disease.66 
 
                                                        
FOR PEOPLE WITH RARE DISEASES, https://www.fda.gov/drugs/drug-information-consumers/orphan-products-hope-
people-rare-diseases 
62 WORLD HEALTH ORG., NEGLECTED TROPICAL DISEASES, https://www.who.int/neglected_diseases/diseases/en/ 
63 See Stanley Plotkin et al., The Complexity and Cost of Vaccine Manufacturing – An Overview, 35 VACCINE 4064 
(2017), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5518734/ (describing the overall complexity of vaccine 
manufacturing); Barney S. Graham et al., Vaccine Development in the Twenty-First Century: Changing Paradigms 
for Elusive Viruses, 86 CLINICAL PHARMA. & THERAPEUTICS 234 (2009), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2931821/ (noting that “[t]he viruses for which new vaccines are 
now in development have also become more challenging”); Morven E. Wilkie & Helen McShane, TB Vaccine 
Development: Where Are We and Why is it So Difficult?, 70 THORAX 299 (2015), 
https://thorax.bmj.com/content/70/3/299 (exemplifying the scientific challenges in the field of vaccine R&D 
targeting tuberculosis). 
64 Outside the context of a pandemic like COVID-19.  
65 See Cynthia Liu, Global Vaccine Trends: R&D and Market Insights Driving New Opportunities, AM. CHEMICAL 
SOC. (May 3, 2019), https://www.cas.org/blog/global-vaccine-trends-rd-and-market-insights-driving-new-
opportunities 
66 See e.g. Susanne Rauch et al., New Vaccine Technologies to Combat Outbreak Situations, 9 FRONTIERS 
IMMUNOLOGY (2018) (describing different types of vaccine technology used in the context of infectious disease). 
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Figure 1: Distribution of vaccine-related substance classes (according to chemical substance count)67 
 
If intellectual property as a system of incentives were truly able to correct for shortcomings 
in market-driven R&D pipelines, then we should have relatively robust levels of vaccine R&D in 
the field of infectious diseases—the group of pathogens causing outbreaks affecting the health of 
individuals and communities locally, transnationally and now, with diseases like COVID-19, at a 
global level.68 Because the toll of these diseases can be enormous, R&D systems calibrated 
primarily by public health imperatives would allocate abundant resources to vaccine R&D in this 
                                                        
67 Adapted from Cynthia Liu, Global Vaccine Trends: R&D and Market Insights Driving New Opportunities, AM. 
CHEMICAL SOC. (May 3, 2019), https://www.cas.org/blog/global-vaccine-trends-rd-and-market-insights-driving-
new-opportunities 
68 See WORLD HEALTH ORG., CORONAVIRUS DISEASE (COVID-2019) SITUATION REPORTS, 
https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/situation-reports/ (reporting over three million 
cases of infection and close to 220,000 deaths globally on April 30, 2020 – to be updated closer to publication date). 
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space; failing this, the utilitarian intellectual property narrative would then have the patent system 
artificially create incentives to R&D that would, in substantial ways, offset the commercially 
unappealing prospects of many vaccines targeting infectious diseases.69 That, however, has not 
been the case.70 Even against the backdrop of the COVID-19 pandemic—an event of 
unprecedented magnitude in the age of biotechnology—the race to develop new vaccines has been 
both tempered by profitability considerations71 and renewed discussed about the need for non-IP 
incentives.72 
It is in this sense that vaccines, as opposed to several other types of biopharmaceutical 
products,73 often present would-be funders and developers with “unhappy” R&D prospects, 
particularly in the field of infectious diseases—one of the areas where, paradoxically, the public 
health need is often the greatest. 
 
                                                        
69 There are, of course, many other forms of dealing with problems related to incentives. An emerging solution for 
incentives problems specific to the field of vaccines is the formation of public-private partnerships. See generally 
CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY GOVERNANCE, AND 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, MARGARET CHON ET AL., EDS. (2018). 
70 See e.g. Gary Wong & Xiangguo Qiu, Funding Vaccines for Emerging Infectious Diseases, 14 HUMAN VACCINES 
& IMMUNOTHERAPEUTICS 1760, 1760 (2018), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6067896/ 
71 See e.g. Nicole Wetsman, Health Secretary Alex Azar Won’t Promise that a Coronavirus Vaccine Would Be 
Affordable, THE VERGE (Feb. 27, 2020), https://www.theverge.com/2020/2/27/21155879/alex-azar-coronavirus-
vaccine-affordable-insurance; Gerald Posner, Big Pharma May Pose an Obstacle to Vaccine Development, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 2, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/02/opinion/contributors/pharma-vaccines.html 
72 See e.g. Daniel Hemel & Lisa L. Ouellette, Want a Coronavirus Vaccine, Fast? Here's a Solution, TIME 
MAGAZINE (Mar. 4, 2020), https://time.com/5795013/coronavirus-vaccine-prize-challenge/ (proposing the creation 
of an ad hoc prize for the development of coronavirus vaccines). 
73 See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text. 
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B. TRANSACTIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
Now let us consider the case of vaccine candidates in the infectious disease space that 
manage to attract sufficient funding to get to the later stages of R&D. This occurs when there is 
sufficient momentum behind a particular disease that translates into the availability of funding. 
For instance, this has been the case with R&D on malaria vaccines, which have received financial 
support from sources like the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation.74 This is also what happens when  
large infectious disease outbreaks drastically alter the incentives landscape—in an almost perverse 
way, as recently illustrated by the quick propagation of COVID-19, which cured the incentives 
problem almost overnight, resulting in an extraordinarily populated race to develop vaccines 
targeting the emerging pathogen.75 
Curing the incentives problem—even if temporarily76—does not necessarily guarantee that 
scientifically viable vaccines will come to market in a timely fashion, or that they will be made 
available to indicated populations at affordable price points. While distinct, these two types of 
problems are rooted in the same (potential) malfunction of intellectual property regimes: because 
the incentives component of intellectual property rests by design on an exclusionary legal 
architecture, it is possible for rightsholders to (mis)use their exclusionary power in ways that delay 
or curtail access to socially valuable goods. In this sense, the exclusionary tools used to promote 
                                                        
74 See e.g. Leslie Wroughton, Gates Gives $168 Mln for Malaria Vaccines Research, Reuters (Sept. 25, 2018), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-un-assembly-malariahealth/gates-gives-168-mln-for-malaria-vaccines-research-
idUSTRE48O9CD20080925. See also BILL & MELINDA GATES FOUND., MALARIA STRATEGY OVERVIEW, 
https://www.gatesfoundation.org/what-we-do/global-health/malaria 
75 See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
76 Outbreak-spiked funding tends to thin out fairly quickly, a phenomenon that often begins even before the outbreak 
has ended. See Rutschman, IP Preparedness for Outbreak Diseases, supra note 57, at 1253 (addressing this problem 
with reference to Ebola R&D in the later stages of the 2014-16 pandemic). 
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innovation in the form of rights-as-incentives can be (mis)used at the transactional level, both 
when transfers of intellectual property are required for further development of biopharmaceutical 
products like vaccines, and at the commercialization stage of fully developed and licensed 
products. The Essay now illustrates both problems in turn. 
An example of the first scenario—transactional issues affecting transfers of vaccine-related 
intellectual property during R&D stages—occurred during the 2014-16 Ebola outbreak. It involved 
the then-leading Ebola vaccine candidate in the wake of the 2014-15 outbreak, for which a small 
American pharmaceutical company held a license issued by the Canadian government.77 The 
company, NewLink, failed to test the vaccine and seek regulatory approval in the years prior to 
the outbreak, as required by the terms of the license.78 Moreover, as the outbreak unfolded, the 
company maintained the same course for a few months—neither developing the vaccine nor 
licensing to another company.79 NewLink had initially paid $205,000 to the Canadian government 
for the license.80 When it finally agreed to transfer the rights over the vaccine candidate to another 
company, NewLink received 30 million, with the possibility of an additional $20 million payment 
should the vaccine candidate enter clinical trials.81 
This example illustrates a problem stemming from concentration of patent-protected 
technology in a single entity unwilling or incapable of developing it even when the incentives 
                                                        
77 See generally Rutschman, IP Preparedness for Outbreak Diseases, supra note 57. 
78 Denise Grady, Ebola Vaccine, Ready for Test, Sat on the Shelf, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/24/health/without-lucrative-market-potential- 
ebola-vaccine-was-shelved-for-years.html 
79 Lisa Schnirring, NewLink, Merck Deal Boosts Prospects for Ebola Vaccine, CIDRAP (Nov. 24, 2014), 
http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/news-perspective/2014/11/newlink-merck-deal- boosts-prospects-ebola-vaccine 
80 Id., ib. 
81 Id., ib. 
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problem has been solved. Because, unlike COVID-19, most outbreaks so far have been more 
temporally and/or geographically limited, this failure to develop promising vaccine technology 
can come at a heightened cost in the context of infectious diseases: patent hold-up82 during an 
outbreak, even if momentary, happens at a time of spiked funding, which is traditionally short-
lived—and thus rights-as-incentives that were granted for utilitarian purposes now stand in the 
way of maximization of funding and R&D goodwill.83  
The second type of problem that might occur at the transactional level concerns the pricing 
of, or access to, a vaccine that has overcome both the incentives problem and potential 
transactional problems during R&D stages. Even if the development and licensure of a new 
vaccine constitutes a significant achievement from a scientific and technological perspective, that 
achievement will be significantly thwarted—at a minimum from a public health perspective—if 
that vaccine is not made available to those who need it. Yet, for the past several years, there have 
been recurrent concerns that emerging vaccines for infectious diseases might be priced in ways 
that effectively exclude segments of indicated populations from receiving it. 
This was the case with Zika vaccine candidates in the wake of the 2015-16 outbreak,84 
during which scholars and policymakers alike worried that an exclusive license for the then-
leading Zika vaccine candidate would grant a single company the de facto ability to price out 
                                                        
82 For a general overview of the phenomenon of patent hold-up, see Thomas F. Cotter et al., Demystifying Patent 
Holdup, 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1501 (2019). 
83 As well as possibly expedited regulatory review pathways available to products needed to target the pathogen 
causing an outbreak. See generally Stuart L. Nightingale et al., Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) to Enable Use 
of Needed Products in Civilian and Military Emergencies, United States, Emergency 13 EMERGENCY INFECTIOUS 
DISEASES 1046 (2007).  
84 See generally Ana Santos Rutschman, Vaccine Licensure in the Public Interest: Lessons from the Development of 
the U.S. Army Zika Vaccine, 127 YALE L. J. F. 651 (2018). 
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poorer indicated populations.85 It is also a concern at the time of writing, as dozens of vaccines 
targeting COVID-19 are under development, but little has emerged to assure the public at large of 
their ultimate affordability. If anything, the opposite has happened.86  
In late February 2020, when asked at a congressional hearing whether potential coronavirus 
vaccines would be “affordable for anyone who needs it”, Secretary of Health and Human Services 
Alex Azar replied: “We would want to ensure that we work to make it affordable, but we can’t 
control that price because we need the private sector to invest. (…) Price controls won’t get us 
there.”87 
This statement pitches the incentives function of intellectual property against the exercise 
of exclusionary rights in the biopharmaceutical arena, as if the two were not interdependent. 
Moreover, it implies that the rights-as-incentives do not have to be balanced first within the 
intellectual property universe, and second when measured against larger legal and policy goals and 
structures, including public health needs. 
The recurrence of transactional malfunctions with regard to vaccine technology in the field 
of infectious diseases is especially problematic as recent outbreaks remind us of the likely and 
imminent increase of our collective need for new vaccines, as increased travel patterns,88 
                                                        
85 See e.g. Ed Silverman, The Battle Over a Fair Price for Zika Vaccines, STAT (May 18, 2017), 
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-battle-over-a-fair-price-for-zika-vaccines/. R&D on this vaccine 
candidate has, in the meantime, stopped. See e.g. Helen Braswell, Sanofi Quietly Pulls the Plug on its Zika Vaccine 
Project, STAT (Sept. 2, 2017), https://www.statnews.com/2017/09/02/sanofi-zika-vaccine/. 
86 See Wetsman, Health Secretary Alex Azar Won’t Promise that a Coronavirus Vaccine Would Be Affordable, 
supra note 71. 
87 See Isabel Togoh, Health Secretary Alex Azar Refuses to Guarantee Coronavirus Vaccine Would Be Affordable 
For All, FORBES (Feb. 27, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/isabeltogoh/2020/02/27/health-secretary-alex-azar-
refuses-to-guarantee-coronavirus-vaccine-would-be-affordable-for-all/#794efe16490c 
88 See generally Mary E. Wilson, Travel and the Emergence of Infectious Diseases, 1 EMERGING INFECTIOUS 39 
DISEASES (1995), https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/1/2/95-0201_article 
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globalization89 and climate change90 pose renewed challenges to public health. The following 
section considers how less property-centric treatments of intellectual property may help us work 
through some of the transactional problems we currently face in the field of vaccines. 
This is not to say that there are not mechanisms embedded in intellectual property laws 
designed to curb the forms of intellectual property (mis)use surveyed above—from patent-specific 
provisions addressing the licensure of publicly funded goods91 or allowing for government 
interventions,92 to compulsory licensing mechanisms derived from international intellectual 
property laws.93 Rather, the point of this Essay is to suggest that we consider additional solutions, 
especially in light of the fact that many of these balancing mechanisms embedded into the legal 
architecture are seldom used (if used at all)94 in the United States. The topic the Essay next turns 
to thus explores an alternative95 way of lessening the detrimental impact of overly exclusionary 
effects often associated with the transactional side of intellectual property rights in the field of 
                                                        
89 See generally INST. MED., THE IMPACT OF GLOBALIZATION ON INFECTIOUS DISEASE EMERGENCE AND CONTROL: 
WORKSHOP SUMMARY, STACEY KNOBLER ET AL., EDITORS, NAT’T ACADEMIES PRESS (2006), 
https://www.nap.edu/catalog/11588/the-impact-of-globalization-on-infectious-disease-emergence-and-control 
90 See generally, U.S. CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, CLIMATE EFFECTS ON HEALTH, 
https://www.cdc.gov/climateandhealth/effects/default.htm 
91 E.g. 35 U.S.C. § 209(a)(1) (2012). See also Rutschman, Vaccine Licensure in the Public Interest, supra note 84. 
92 E.g. 28 U.S.C. § 1498. See generally Hannah Brennan et al., A Prescription for Excessive Drug Pricing: 
Leveraging Government Patent Use for Health, 18 YALE J.L. & TECH. (2017) (describing the applicability of 28 
U.S.C. § 1498 to pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical products). 
93 TRIPs Article 31. See generally Frederick M. Abbott & Rudolf Van Puymbroeck, Compulsory Licensing for 
Public Health: Giving Effect to the Decision on Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the 
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, A Guide and Model Documents, WORLD BANK WORKING PAPER 61 (2005). 
94 As is the case of compulsory licensing of pharmaceuticals. Other examples include government march-in rights 
associated with federally funded innovation. For an overview of the topic see generally Ryan Whalen, Will the 
Agencies Ever Go Marching In? Public Rights in Federally-Funded Inventions, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 1083 (2015). 
95 And cumulative. 
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vaccine R&D—namely, through the adoption of liability regimes that place less emphasis on the 
proprietary contours of patents by allowing use of protected goods against the payment of just 
compensation to the patent holder. While exploring this topic entails some references to the 
broader nature of intellectual property rights, and in particular a nod to the now storied yet 
unsettled debate surrounding the property question in patent law, the Essay addresses these 
questions narrowly, with reference to the highly idiosyncratic field of vaccines. 
 
III. PROPERTY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND LIABILITY RULES 
I have suggested in previous work that liability regimes constitute an overlooked solution 
to transactional problems affecting critical technology essential to the development of goods 
needed to address pressing public health needs.96 Here I develop that theme by connecting it to the 
ongoing debate on the nature of intellectual property rights, as the adoption of liability regimes 
implies a departure from strongly proprietary conceptualizations of intellectual property rights. 
Part A provides an overview of property-informed conceptions of patent rights in American 
caselaw. Part B explains how liability regimes may co-exist within proprietary frameworks, and 
sketches out how liability regimes can be implemented in the field of vaccines in order to help 
mitigate transactional problems during the later stages of vaccine R&D.  
 
                                                        
96 The Vaccine Race, supra note 27, 759-769. 
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A. IP AS PROPERTY 
The Patent Act establishes that “patents shall have the attributes of personal property.”97 
The extent to which patent rights should be regarded as form of property proper—as opposed to a 
distinguishable, more elusive legal form—has long prompted intense debate.98 
The Supreme Court, and later on the Federal Circuit, have repeatedly emphasized the 
property dimensions of intellectual property rights, and in particular of patents. In United States v. 
American Bell Telephone Co., Justice Miller framed patents as “private property of the patentee.”99  
In Consolidated Fruit-Jar Co. v. Wright, a Supreme Court case involving a patent covering 
Mason jars, Justice Swayne stated that “[a] patent for an invention is as much property as a patent 
for land. The right rests on the same foundation, and is surrounded and protected by the same 
sanctions.”100 This property-coasting approach has persisted to this day. Just over a century after 
Consolidated Fruit Jar Co., writing for the majority in Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education 
Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, Chief Justice Rehnquist characterized patents as a long-
recognized “species of property.”101 
Many of the analyses of the nature of patents as a form of property have arisen in the 
context of courts’ discussions of the Takings Doctrine and its applicability to intellectual 
                                                        
97 35 U. S. C. §261. 
98 For an overview of the scholarly debate see e.g. Frank H. Easterbrook, Intellectual Property Is Still Property, 13 
HARV.. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 108 (1990); Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a Property 
Paradigm, 54 DUKE L.J. 1 (2004); Stephen L. Carter, Does it Matter Whether Intellectual Property is Property?, 68 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 715 (1993). 
99 United States v. American Bell Telephone Co., 128 U. S. 315, 370 (1888). See also Brown v. Duchesne, 19 How. 
183, 197 (1856); McCormick Harvesting Machine Co. v. Aultman, 169 U. S. 606, 609 (1898) (cited in Oil States, 
infra note 110). 
100 Consol. Fruit-Jar Co. v. Wright, 94 U.S. 92, 96 (1877). 
101 Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 642 (1999). 
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property.102 For instance, the Federal Circuit has applied the three-prong test developed by the 
Supreme Court in Penn Central to identify regulatory takings of real property103 to cases involving 
patents.104 Citing Consolidated Fruit Jar Co.,105 Judge Newman wrote in Patlex Corp. v. 
Mossinghoff that “[i]t is beyond reasonable debate that patents are property.”106 Grounded on this 
view of patent rights, the Court went on to apply the Penn Central factors to analyze due process 
issues in the context of patent reexamination.107 
In 2015, in Horne v. Department of Agriculture, the Supreme Court reiterated the idea that, 
for purposes of application of the Takings Clause, there is no differentiation between real and 
personal property.108 Gregory Dolin and Irina Manta have argued that this decision subjects patents 
to the Takings Clause.109 
                                                        
102 The articulation between intellectual property rights and the takings clause is often traced back to Madison’s 
expansive framing of property: “Government is instituted to protect property of every sort” (emphasis added). James 
Madison, Property, PAPERS (Mar. 29, 1792), at 266. For a discussion of the evolution of the treatment of patents in 
connection with the Takings Clause, see generally Adam Mossoff, Patents as Constitutional Private Property: The 
Historical Protection of Patents Under the Takings Clause, 87 B.U. L. REV. 689 (2007). See also Thomas F. Cotter, 
Do Federal Uses of Intellectual Property Implicate the Fifth Amendment?, 50 FLA. L. REV. 529 (1998); Gregory 
Dolin & Irena D. Manta, Taking Patents, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 719 (2016). 
103 Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
104 Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
105 And borrowing from Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarian worldview of property and property rights. Id., at 599. 
106 Id., ib. 
107 Id., at 603 (applying “the Penn Central standard to [the appellant’s] property rights”). 
108 Horne v. Department of Agriculture, 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2426 (2015) (“Nothing in the text or history of the Takings 
Clause, or our precedents, suggests that the rule is any different when it comes to appropriation of personal 
property”). 
109 See Dolin & Manta, supra note 102. Previously, in Zoltek, the Federal Circuit had concluded that the Takings 
Clause did not apply to patents; Zoltek Corp. v. United States, Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 442 F.3d 1345 (Fed. 
Cir. 2006). Camilla Hrdy and Ben Picozzi, however, have made the case that, while the Supreme Court has 
recognized that trade secrets have a “property-like nature,”109 it has not definitively determined that patents should 
be regarded on equal footing with real property even for purposes of applying the Takings Clause. See Camilla A. 
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Most recently, while examining the constitutionality of inter partes review—an adversarial 
form of post-issuance administrative proceeding allowing the Patent and Trademark Office to 
reexamine patent grants—the Supreme Court in Oil States expressly declined to address the 
property question.110 In upholding the constitutionality of inter partes review, Justice Thomas, 
writing for the majority, emphasized the narrowness of the holding and stated that Oil States 
“should not be misconstrued as suggesting that patents are not property for purposes of the Due 
Process Clause or the Takings Clause.”111 
In reaching the conclusion that inter partes review does not violate “the Constitution by 
extinguishing private property rights through a non-Article III forum without a jury,”112 the Court 
examined the nature and characteristics of intellectual property rights from a different viewpoint. 
It distinguished between “public” and “private” rights, and stated that “[p]atents convey only a 
specific form of property right—a public franchise,” with inter partes review falling “squarely 
within the public-rights doctrine.”113 
Judicial forays into queries about the nature of intellectual property have thus tended to 
emphasize the property components of patent rights. While consistent with the statutory language 
and framework, this emphasis does not exclude the possibility of regarding patents as a 
differentiated form of property—including viewing patents as grants or public franchises that are 
                                                        
Hrdy & Ben Picozzi, The AIA is Not a Taking: A Response to Dolin & Manta, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 472 
(2016). 
110 Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group, LLC, 138 S.Ct. 1365 (2018). 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. at 1373. This distinction is not new in Supreme Court jurisprudence: the grant of a patent has long been 
regarded as the exercise of a public right; in United States v. American Bell Telephone Co., for instance, the Court 
characterized this grant as the act of an administrative agency which takes “public rights of immense value” and 
“bestow[s] them upon the patentee.” United States v. American Bell Telephone Co., 128 U. S. 315, 370 (1888). 
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best described in non-property terms. By reserving the property question in Oil States, the Supreme 
Court left the door open to worldviews of intellectual property that are not centered on property 
features. 
Moreover, even if patents were to be deemed a form of property proper—or essentially 
analogizable to property—the caselaw described above, as well as its progeny, have resorted to 
the property analogy predominantly in the context of application of the Takings Clause. This 
approach suggests that courts are primarily concerned with instances in which the economic 
dimensions traditionally associated with patent-attributable exclusivity are lessened. As seen in 
the following section, those concerns can be addressed even in instances in which liability regimes 
allow competitors to use patented technology—namely through principles of fair compensation. 
 
B. LIABILITY REGIMES IN IP: A SOLUTION FOR VACCINE R&D DURING PUBLIC HEALTH CRISES? 
Liability rules,114 also known as “take-and-pay” regimes, allow follow-on innovators to 
pay an “objectively determined value” for someone else’s entitlement. As Jack Balkin and Ian 
Ayres have put it, liability rules give “at least one party an option to take an entitlement 
nonconsensually and pay the entitlement owner some exercise price.”115 Consider the case of the 
Ebola vaccine candidate described in Part II.B:116 under property rules, a follow-on innovator 
wishing to quickly develop and test a vaccine candidate as early as possible during an outbreak,  
would need not only to obtain NewLink’s permission, but also to support the transaction costs 
                                                        
114 As opposed to property rules, in the Calabresi-Melamed formulation. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas 
Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 
(1972). 
115 Jack M. Balkin & Ian Ayres, Legal Entitlements as Auctions: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Beyond, 106 
YALE L. J. 703, 704 (1996). 
116 See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text. 
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associated with the bargaining and licensure processes, which are likely to spread over a significant 
period of time. Under a system of liability rules, however, the same follow-on innovator would be 
able to “nonconsensually” take the technology needed to make this vaccine candidate upon 
payment of an “objectively determined value.”  
Liability regimes thus accomplish two things. They eliminate the threshold question of 
whether a patentee will even negotiate a license in the first place. And they lower transactions 
costs by reducing the bargaining process to a determination of the value of the entitlement. 
These features of liability regimes render them especially apt to facilitate certain transfers 
of technology during situations of public health crisis—and, in particular, in the case of severe or 
pandemic outbreaks of infectious diseases. From a legal perspective, because the Supreme Court 
has reserved the property question, there is no doctrinal or precedential impediment to recognizing 
that patent regimes, or at least certain aspects thereof, are not completely analogizable to property 
regimes. From a policy perspective, infusing some pockets of patent law and practice with liability 
features—or micro-liability regimes—would result in a nimbler legal architecture for innovators 
during periods of public health crisis. And from a political economy perspective, because the 
approach proposed in the Essay is limited to very specific sets of technology needed for expedited 
vaccine R&D during abnormal public health circumstances, the disruption to established interests 
would be relatively moderate, as well as limited in both scope and time. 
This Essay does not support the view that a liability regime is desirable for all features of 
vaccine innovation. As a form of technology based on the weakening or killing of a pathogen, 
vaccines constitute a fairly old form of technology.117 Within the field of vaccines, however, many 
                                                        
117 See Rutschman, The Vaccine Race, at 738. See also generally Alexandra Minna Stern & Howard Markel, The 
History of Vaccines and Immunization: Familiar Patterns, New Challenges, 24 HEALTH AFF. 611 (2005). 
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components of contemporary vaccine technology (for instance, certain adjuvants), as well as 
emerging vaccine platform technology118 (such as mRNA-based vaccines),119 are the product of 
much more complex R&D processes than the ones associated with vaccine innovation through 
most of the twentieth century. I have contended elsewhere that liability regimes, even in situations 
of pronounced health care need, should be restricted to “low hanging fruit:” simpler forms of 
vaccine technology, not the latest advancements in the field of vaccinology, immunology and 
related fields.120 The reason behind this distinction is two-fold. First, it acknowledges the political 
economy of contemporary innovation in biotech, which depends in significant part on the 
engagement of the private sector.121 And second, it is mindful of the fact that the adoption of an 
explicit liability regime in patent law—even if restricted to a sub-sector of R&D occurring during 
formally declared public health crises—would constitute an exceptional legal regime, and as such 
should be designed as narrowly as possible. 
The ongoing COVID-19 vaccine race illustrates the need for this distinction. As of mid-
April 2020, there were over 100 R&D projects.122 Some of these projects relied on older forms of 
                                                        
118 See JOHNS HOPKINS CENTER FOR HEALTH SECURITY, VACCINE PLATFORMS: STATE OF THE FIELD AND LOOMING 
CHALLENGES, https://www.centerforhealthsecurity.org/our-work/pubs_archive/pubs-pdfs/2019/190423-OPP-
platform-report.pdf (adopting the Webster Dictionary definition of platform as “a vehicle used for a particular 
purpose or to carry a usually specified type of equipment.”) See also WORLD HEALTH ORG., GUIDELINES ON THE 
QUALITY, SAFETY AND EFFICACY OF EBOLA VACCINES (2017), 
https://www.who.int/biologicals/expert_committee/BS2327_Ebola_Vaccines_Guidelines.pdf?ua=1 (defining the 
concept as “a production technology with which different viral vectored vaccines are produced by incorporating 
heterologous genes for different proteins into an identical viral vector backbone”). 
119 See Norberto Pardi et al., mRNA Vaccines — A New Era in Vaccinology, 17 NATURE REVIEWS DRUG DISCOVERY 
261 (2018), https://www.nature.com/articles/nrd.2017.243 
120 See Rutschman, Vaccine Race, 760-762. 
121 See Liza Vertinsky et al., The Problem with Relying on Profits to Produce Pandemic Drugs, ___ (forthcoming, 
2020) (manuscript on file with author). 
122 See The COVID-19 Vaccine Development Landscape, supra note 9. 
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vaccine development, such as inactivation or attenuation of the virus.123 Yet others relied on DNA 
and RNA vaccine technology,124 which constitute a recent development in vaccine R&D and are 
still in its early stages.125 For further context, consider how the World Health Organization has 
described the emergence of DNA vaccine technology as opposed to pre-existing types of vaccine 
R&D: 
For over a hundred years vaccination has been effected by one of 
two approaches: either introducing specific antigens against which 
the immune system reacts directly; or introducing live attenuated 
infectious agents that replicate within the host without causing 
disease synthesize the antigens that subsequently prime the immune 
system. Recently, a radically new approach to vaccination has been 
developed. It involves the direct introduction into appropriate 
tissues of a plasmid containing the DNA sequence encoding the 
antigen(s) against which an immune response is sought, and relies 
on the in situ production of the target antigen. This approach offers 
a number of potential advantages over traditional approaches 
(…).126 
 
A liability regime would be appropriate for less recent forms of vaccine technology or 
components thereof, not for emerging ones. For instance, the vaccine candidate that the U.S. Army 
was able to develop in a matter of months during the 2015-16 Zika outbreak, ZPIV (Zika purified 
inactivated virus)127 was based on pre-existing vaccine technology which the Army had developed 
in connection with a different virus in the Zika family.128 Long-established forms of vaccine 
                                                        
123 Id., ib. 
124 Id., ib. See also WORLD HEALTH ORG., DNA VACCINES, https://www.who.int/biologicals/areas/vaccines/dna/en/; 
Laura Blackburn, RNA Vaccines: An Introduction, PHG FOUND. POL’Y BRIEFING (Oct. 2018), 
https://www.phgfoundation.org/briefing/rna-vaccines 
125 Id., ib. 
126 WORLD HEALTH ORG., DNA VACCINES, supra note 124.  
127 See e.g. NAT’L INST. ALLERGY & INFECTIOUS DISEASES, TRIALS SHOW INACTIVATED ZIKA VIRUS VACCINE IS 
SAFE AND IMMUNOGENIC (Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.niaid.nih.gov/news-events/trials-show-inactivated-zika-virus-
vaccine-safe-and-immunogenic 
128 For a timeline of this particular R&D project see Rutschman, Vaccine Licensure in the Public Interest, supra note 
84. 
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technology can thus be quickly used to target emerging pathogens, and limiting a liability regime 
to some forms of vaccine technology—and even a limited number of components—is not 
incompatible with covering a significant amount of technology, while preserving the status quo of 
the vaccine innovation ecosystem for player involved in evolving forms of vaccine R&D. 
Having considered the scope of the proposed liability regime approach, the Essay 
concludes by outlining possibilities for the establishment of such a regime. First, in line with the 
restrictive nature of the proposal, the liability regime would only apply to a limited set of 
technologies needed in vaccine R&D for infectious diseases in situation of a public health crisis. 
Both the determination of the components integrated in this regime and the qualification of “public 
health crisis” would be made by an entity (or a combination of entities) in the public health space. 
Examples of these entities include the U.S. National Institutes of Health or the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention, or even the World Health Organization. The formal event that would serve 
as trigger for the activation of the liability could be a declaration of a public health crisis—for 
instance, a declaration of public health emergency by the Department of Health and Human 
Services,129 or a declaration of a public health emergency of international concern by the World 
Health Organization.130 
Second, a “taking” of vaccine technology under the liability regime—a duration that could 
be established to match the duration of the formally declared public health emergency—would be 
subject to the payment of just compensation.131 In an ideal formulation, the “objectively 
determined value” of the liability entitlement would be established ex ante to reduce uncertainty, 
                                                        
129 U.S. DEP’T. HEALTH & HUM. SERV., PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY DECLARATION, 
https://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/legal/Pages/phedeclaration.aspx 
130 WORLD HEALTH ORG., IHR PROCEDURES CONCERNING PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCIES OF INTERNATIONAL 
CONCERN (PHEIC), https://www.who.int/ihr/procedures/pheic/en/ 
131 See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
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friction between original and follow-on innovators, and the likelihood of the necessity of a court 
intervention. Such ex ante determination could be set in the form of a “price menu.” Instead of a 
fixed price, the “menu” could also be implemented through the adoption of a formula, which could 
be used ex post by the parties.132 
And third, the most straightforward way to implement such a regime would be through 
legislative intervention. This could be accomplished by the enactment of a law that either defines 
which vaccine-related technology components are subject to a liability regime or grants a particular 
institutional actor this definitional power.133 This mirrors what happened in the case of the priority 
review vouchers currently administered by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, which apply 
to selected diseases—primarily neglected tropical diseases—and which were originally defined by 
Congress but later on added to as public health emergencies arose.134 
As noted above, applying liability rules furthers economic efficiency by reducing 
bargaining uncertainty and transaction costs. A regime like the one sketched in this Essay would, 
furthermore, be beneficial from a distributive justice perspective, as it would facilitate the 
development of, and access to, critical health technologies that are sorely needed to improve 
preparedness in an era of increasing globalized outbreaks of infectious diseases. 
                                                        
132 The exact formulation of the “price menu” would be best developed by experts in economics and other relevant 
fields. 
133 Such as the case of the agencies and international organization alluded to above. Supra notes 129-130 and 
accompanying text. 
134 Rutschman, The Priority Review Voucher Program at the FDA: From Neglected Tropical Diseases to the 21st 
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